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Abstract—In this paper we propose a novel image encryption 
scheme. The proposed method is based on the chaos theory. Our 
cryptosystem uses the chaos theory to define a dynamic chaotic 
Look-Up Table (LUT) to compute the new value of the current 
pixel to cipher. Applying this process on each pixel of the plain 
image, we generate the encrypted image.  
The results of different experimental tests, such as Key space 
analysis, Information Entropy and Histogram analysis, show that 
the proposed encryption image scheme seems to be protected 
against various attacks. A comparison between the plain and 
encrypted image, in terms of correlation coefficient, proves that 
the plain image is very different from the encrypted one. 
Keywords- Chaos; Image encryption; Logistic-map; Look-Up 
Table. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, in the digital world, the security of transmitted 
digital images/videos becomes more and more vital, against the 
web attacks which become important [1]. So, cryptography is 
used to confirm security in open networks [2].  
Cryptography is the science that uses mathematics to offer 
encryption algorithms to protect information. 
Many cryptographic methods have been proposed. These 
techniques are classified into three categories: 
• Symmetric cryptography: in this class the same key is 
used for encryption and decryption. Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) are the best known examples of symmetric 
encryption [3] [4]. 
• Asymmetric cryptography: two different keys are used. 
The first realization of a public key algorithm called 
RSA [5] according to its inventors Rivest, Shamir and 
Adelman, is the most used algorithm in asymmetric 
encryption. 
• Hybrid cryptography: it is based on combination of the 
best features of symmetric cryptography and 
asymmetric [6]. 
Security has become a key issue in the world of electronic 
communication. An efficient cryptosystem should not be 
broken by hackers. 
In this research we have tried to propose a secure and 
simple method of image encryption based on chaotic function. 
This paper is organized as follows: section II describes the 
relation between chaos and cryptography and presents the 
Logistic Map function. The proposed method is introduced in 
section III. In section IV, we discuss the experimental results 
and test the efficiency of the algorithm. Finally, section V is 
devoted to the conclusion. 
II. CHAOTIC SYSTEM 
Since the 1990’s, Chaotic Systems (CS) have attracted 
researchers to use them in secure communication [7] [8]. 
Most CS proposed in literature are characterized by certain 
properties [9] that facilitate their use in the design of modern 
cryptographic systems. These properties are essentially the 
ergodicity, sensitivity to the initial values and to the controlling 
parameters. 
In modern cryptography, the CS have been used 
extensively in the development of cryptosystems. The CS are 
among the best known and most widely used in cryptography, 
they cite the Logistic Map (LM). The Logistic Map [10] is one 
of the most famous and simplest one-dimensional map. 
Therefore this function has been studied recently for 
cryptography applications. The LM is widely used in image 
encryption [11] [12]. 
The Logistic Map function is expressed by the following 
formula: 
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Where x is a floating number, which takes values in the 
interval [0, 1], n = 0, 1, 2, … and µ is the control parameter  
0 < µ ≤ 4.
 
If parameter µ takes a value between 0 and 3, the Logistic 
Map, which is defined by equation (1), is seen to converge to a 
particular value after some iteration. As parameter µ is further 
increased, the curves bifurcations become faster and faster. µ 
should be greater than 3.5784257 (known as the "point of 
accumulation") in order to have a chaotic system. Finally for 
µ=3.9 to 4, the chaos values are generated in the complete 
range of 0 to 1 [13]. 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
In this section, we present our new image cryptosystem. 
The architecture of the proposed method is shown in “Fig. 1-
3”. 
In the first step, we generate a chaotic matrix using the 
Logistic Map function LM1 (x0XOR and µ0XOR). We mix this 
chaotic matrix with the plain image using the logical function 
XOR to obtain the initial encrypted image I1. 
 
Figure 1.  XOR Chaotic encryption 
For each pixel P1 from I1, we generate a chaotic LUT using 
the Logistic Map function (LM2) having as parameters µ0 and 
x0(Pc). Where Pc is the value of the previous encrypted pixel by 
our cryptosystem. The initial condition x0(Pc) depends on the 
previous value of the ciphered pixel and x0. In addition, we 
limit x0(Pc) values between 0.1 and 0.9. 
 
Figure 2.  Chaotic Dynamic Look-Up Table 
Applying the new LUT to Pi we obtain the final encrypted 
pixel. We repeat this process for each pixel from the initial 
encrypted image to get the final encrypted one. 
 
Figure 3.  Chaotic Look-Up table encryption 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Image information differs from the textual one and has very 
interesting properties such as its large capacity, redundancy and 
strong correlation strength between neighboring pixels. 
According to these properties, the security of a cryptosystem 
image is evaluated by a statistical analysis, the sensitivity 
analysis and the differential analysis [14] [15]. 
We test our method using an image test bank containing 30 
different gray scale images with different size.  
A good cryptosystem should ideally be robust against all 
kinds of attacks (cryptanalytic and statistical attacks). Thus, in 
this section we give the experimental results to prove the 
performance of our encryption image scheme. 
A. Key Space Analysis 
The key used in our method includes the following 
combination {x0, µ0, x0XOR, µ0XOR} where all the parameters are 
real numbers. We use MATLAB 7.6 in our study. This 
mathematical tool codes real in 8 bytes. So, all the parameters 
are presented in 64 bits. Thus, the proposed encryption image 
scheme {264 x 264 x 264 x 264} = 2256 has different combinations 
of the secret key. 
B. Histogram Analysis 
Histogram analysis is one of the security analyses which 
give us the statistical properties of the ciphered image. 
Histogram may reflect how pixels in an image are distributed.  
In order to have a perfect encrypted image, the histogram of 
the image must have a uniform distribution. 
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Figure 4.  Histogram analysis: (a) plain image, (b) plain image histogram, (c) 
encrypted image, (d) encrypted image histogram 
Referring to the obtained results, we can clearly see that 
the plain image “Fig. 4.a” differs significantly from the 
correspondent encrypted one “Fig. 4.c”. Moreover, the 
histogram of the encrypted image “Fig. 4.d” is fairly uniform 
which makes it difficult to extract the pixels statistical nature 
of the plain image “Fig. 4.b”. 
C. Information Entropy 
The entropy was founded by Shannon in 1948 [16] [17] and 
is given in the following equation: 
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Where P(mi) represents the probability of symbol mi. The 
entropy H(m) is expressed in bits. 
From “Fig. 4.d”, the encrypted image has a uniform 
histogram, which means that the gray levels have the same 
number of occurrences and hence the entropy is maximum. 
Therefore, a grayscale image, where each pixel is represented 
by 8 bits, must have an entropy for the encrypted image, the 
closest possible 8 bits/pixel. [18] 
The entropy of the encrypted Lena image is equal to 
7.9963 ≈ 8 bits/pixel. The obtained value is very close to the 
theoretical one. From this result, it is clear that our encryption 
image scheme is robust against the entropy attack. 
D. Correlation Coefficient Analysis  
Another type of statistical analysis is the correlation 
coefficient analysis [19] [20] [21].  
We calculate the correlation coefficient for a sequence of 
adjacent pixels using the following formula: 
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Here, x and y are the intensity values of two adjacent pixels 
in the image. rxy is the correlation coefficient. The cov(x,y), 
E(x) and D(x) are given as follows:  
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N is the number of adjacent pixels selected from the image 
to calculate the correlation.  
The table below presents the correlation between two 
adjacent pixels for the plain and the encrypted Lena image.  
To test the correlation coefficient, we have chosen 2500 
pairs of two adjacent pixels which are selected randomly from 
both the plain and encrypted image. 
TABLE I.  CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF TWO ADJACENT PIXELS IN THE 
PROPOSED METHOD 
Direction Correlation plain image 
Correlation 
encrypted image 
Diagonal 0.9177 0.0027 
Horizontal 0.9399 -0.0214 
Vertical 0.9692 -0.0022 
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Figure 5.  Correlation between two diagonally adjacent pixels:  
(a) in the plain image, (b) in the encrypted image 
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Figure 6.  Correlation between two horizontally adjacent pixels:  
(a) in the plain image, (b) in the encrypted image 
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Figure 7.  Correlation between two vertically adjacent pixels:  
(a) in the plain image, (b) in the encrypted image 
Fig. 5-7 represents the correlation between two diagonally, 
horizontally and vertically adjacent pixels of the plain and 
encrypted image. We see that the neighboring pixels in the 
plain image have a high correlation, while in the encrypted 
one there is a little correlation. This little correlation between 
two neighbors pixels in the ciphered image makes the brook of 
our cryptosystem difficult. 
E. Differential Analysis  
Three criteria NPCR, UACI and MAE [22] are used to test 
the sensitivity of a single-bit change in the plain image. 
The NPCR means the Number of Pixels Change Rate of 
ciphered image while a pixel of the plain image is changed.  
Let A2 be the changed plain image on one pixel. C1 and C2 
are the ciphered images of the plain image and A2. D is a 
matrix having the same size as the image figures C1 and C2. 
D (i, j) is determined as follows: 
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M and N are the height and width of encrypted images C1 
and C2. 
The Unified Average Changing Intensity (UACI) between 
these two images is defined by the following formula: 
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The Mean Absolute Error is defined by the following 
equation: 
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The NPCR, UACI and MAE results are given in Table II.  
TABLE II.  VALUES RESULTS OF NPCR, UACI AND MAE 
 NPCR UACI MAE 
Lena 99.2874 31.5689 80.5007 
 
Experimentally measured value of NPCR is 99.2874 % and 
UACI is 31.5689 % for Lena image. These results indicate that 
a small change in the plain image introduces a high alteration 
on the ciphered one. So, the proposed method resists the 
differential attacks. 
F. Key Sensitivity Test 
The secret key of our encryption algorithm is composed of 
four values {x0, µ0, x0XOR, µ0XOR}. These values are the 
parameters of the two Logistic Map functions used in our 
cryptosystem. Thus, to analyze the sensitivity of our approach 
to a little change in the secret key, we encrypt Lena image with 
key k0, then, we encrypt the same image with keys k1, k2, k3 
and k4 which present slight differences from the key k0 as 
shown in table III. 
TABLE III.  THE KEYS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS 
 
We label IC (“Fig. 8.b”) the encrypted image of the plain 
image I (“Fig. 8.a”) by our encryption image scheme using the 
key k0. IC1, IC2, IC3 and IC4 are the encrypted images of the plain 
image I using respectively the keys k1, k2 (“Fig. 9.a-b”), k3 and 
k4 (“Fig. 10.a-b”). 
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Figure 8.  (a) Plain image Lena, (b) encrypted image utilizing the original 
key k0 
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Figure 9.  (a) Encrypted image utilizing the key k1, (b) encrypted image 
utilizing the key k2 
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Figure 10.  (a) Encrypted image utilizing the key k3, (b) encrypted image 
utilizing the key k4 
 k0 k1 k2 k3 k4 
x0 0.4 0.4+10-15 0.4 0.4 0.4 
µ0 3.9 3.9 3.9+10-15 3.9 3.9 
x0XOR 0.5002 0.5002 0.5002 0.5002+10-15 0.5002 
µ0XOR 3.87001 3.87001 3.87001 3.87001 3,87001+10-15 
Visually, we can not prove any difference between the 
ciphered images encrypted with different keys. In fact, the use 
of the Logistic Map in the encryption schemes introduces a 
great alteration on the plain image. But according to tables 
belows (Table IV, Table V and Table VI) which summarize the 
comparison between the different images on terms of NPCR, 
MAE and UACI, prove that these images are very different. In 
fact, all NPCR values are higher than 99 % and the UACI 
values are greater than 30 %. We can deduce that our 
encryption algorithm is sensitive to the secret key. 
TABLE IV.  NPCR TABLE FOR SENSITIVITY TO CHANGING CIPHERING KEY 
 IC IC1 IC2 IC3 IC4 I 
IC 0 99.26 99.33 99.63 99.59 99.59 
IC1 99.26 0 99.25 99.26 99.26 99.60 
IC2 99.33 99.25 0 99.33 99.33 99.59 
IC3 99.63 99.26 99.33 0 99.60 99.60 
IC4 99.59 99.26 99.33 99.60 0 99.63 
I 99.59 99.60 99.59 99.60 99.63 0 
TABLE V.  MAE TABLE FOR SENSITIVITY TO CHANGING CIPHERING KEY 
 IC IC1 IC2 IC3 IC4 I 
IC 0 80.47 80.52 85.04 84.93 76.55 
IC1 80.47 0 80.47 80.47 80.47 76.51 
IC2 80.52 80.47 0 80.52 80.52 76.69 
IC3 85.04 80.47 80.52 0 85.32 76.78 
IC4 84.93 82.71 80.52 85.32 0 76.36 
I 76.55 76.51 76.69 76.78 76.36 0 
 
TABLE VI.  UACI TABLE FOR SENSITIVITY TO CHANGING CIPHERING KEY 
 IC IC1 IC2 IC3 IC4 I 
IC 0 31.56 31.58 33.35 33.30 30.02 
IC1 31.56 0 31.56 31.56 32.44 30.00 
IC2 31.58 31.56 0 31.58 31.58 30.07 
IC3 33.35 31.56 31.58 0 33.46 30.11 
IC4 33.30 31.56 31.58 33.46 0 29.95 
I 30.02 30.00 30.07 30.11 29.95 0 
 
Thus, based on the obtained results, we can conclude that a 
slight change in the encryption key (order of 10-15 for real {x0, 
µ0, x0XOR, µ0XOR}) we get two totally different encrypted 
images.  
We now propose to analyze the secret key sensitivity of our 
approach on the decryption scheme. To do this, we encrypted a 
clear image with key k0, and we decrypted it with other keys, 
which are slightly different from the encryption key. ID, ID1, 
ID2, ID3 and ID4 are the deciphered of IC using the keys k0, k1, k2, 
k3 and k4. Visually, we remark that, using a false deciphering 
key yields to a decipher failure “Fig. 11.a-e”. 
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Figure 11.  Key sensitivity test: (a) ID=IC deciphered image using k0, (b) ID1=IC 
deciphered image using k1, (c) ID2=IC deciphered image using k2, (d) ID3=IC 
deciphered image using k3, e) ID4=IC deciphered image using k4 
The tables belows (Table VII, Table VIII and Table IX) 
indicate respectively the values of NPCR, MAE and UACI 
obtained for images with very close decrypted keys. 
TABLE VII.  NPCR TABLE FOR SENSITIVITY TO CHANGING DECIPHERING KEY 
 ID ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 I 
ID 0 99.28 99.23 98.77 98.83 0 
ID1 99.28 0 99.20 99.60 99.58 99.28 
ID2 99.23 99.20 0 99.60 99.59 99.23 
ID3 98.77 99.60 99.60 0 98.86 98.77 
ID4 98.83 99.58 99.59 98.86 0 98.83 
I 0 99.28 99.23 98.77 98.83 0 
 
TABLE VIII.  MAE TABLE FOR SENSITIVITY TO CHANGING DECIPHERING KEY 
 ID ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 I 
ID 0 67.72 67.92 75.41 75.30 0 
ID1 67.72 0 73.47 83.92 84.25 67.72 
ID2 67.92 73.47 0 83.87 84.26 67.92 
ID3 75.41 83.92 83.87 0 82.01 75.41 
ID4 75.30 84.25 84.26 82.01 0 75.3 
I 0 67.72 67.92 75.41 75.3 0 
TABLE IX.  UACI TABLE FOR SENSITIVITY TO CHANGING DECIPHERING KEY 
 ID ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 I 
ID 0 26.56 26.63 29.57 29.53 0 
ID1 26.56 0 28.81 32.91 33.04 26.56 
ID2 26.63 28.81 0 32.89 33.04 26.63 
ID3 29.57 32.91 32.89 0 32.16 29.57 
ID4 29.53 33.04 33.04 32.16 0 29.53 
I 0 26.56 26.63 29.57 29.53 0 
 
The obtained results in tables VII-IX boost the visual 
inspection and prove that a slight error introduced on the true 
encryption key yields to the image decryption failure. 
Consequently, our new encoding image scheme is highly 
sensitive to any change in the ciphering key. 
G. Cryptanalysis 
While cryptography is the discipline that ensures the 
security of confidential information, cryptanalysis [3] is the 
discipline that studies and validates the robustness of 
cryptosystems against attacks. According to Kerckhoffs, the 
security of a cryptosystem depends on the secrecy of the key 
and not on that of the encryption algorithm. To study the 
cryptosystem security, we can utilize the Kerckhoffs principle. 
In this case, the cryptanalyst must be unable to find the key 
even if he has access to the plaintext and its corresponding 
ciphertext. He tries to apply more attacks such as: 
• Ciphertext only attack 
• Chosen plaintext attack 
• Known plaintext attack 
• Chosen ciphertext attack 
Known-plaintext attack is one of the attacks where the 
cryptanalyst owns a plaintext image and its corresponding 
encrypted image. This frequently used attack utilizes the 
known clear image and the ciphered image to extract the 
decryption key or to decrypt another ciphered image. In our 
study, we are based on the known plaintext attack to apply the 
stream key attack on our cryptosystem. “Fig. 12” summarizes 
the key stream attack applied on our cryptosystem. Fig. 12.c 
represents the key stream used to decrypt the ciphered image 
“Fig. 12.b”. The result of this process is shown in “Fig. 12.d”. 
We remarks that the obtained image is equal to the plain image 
“Fig. 12.a”. After that, we utilize the extracted key stream to 
decrypt the image shown in “Fig. 12.e”, which represents the 
encryption of the “Goldhill” image. Fig. 12.f proves the failure 
of this attack. In fact, this last image is fairly different from the 
“Goldhill” plain image illustrated in “Fig. 12.g”.  
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Figure 12.  Failed crack attempt:  
(a) plain image Lena, (b) encrypted Lena image, (c) extracted key stream, (d) 
decrypted Lena image, (e) encrypted Goldhill image, (f) failed attempt to 
crack the cipher image of Goldhill, (g) plain image Goldhill 
The established results shown in “Fig. 12” demonstrate that 
our approach could not be broken by a known plaintext text 
attack. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed an image encryption 
scheme based on the chaos theory. This new proposal uses the 
Logistic Map function to generate a dynamic LUT. This LUT 
depends on previous encrypted pixel. This Feedback 
introduced on the cryptosystem gives it excellent performance. 
In fact, the encrypted image is very different from the plaintext 
one. This dissimilarity is due to the random introduced by the 
chaos. The use of the Logistic Map gives the proposed 
cryptosystem a sensitivity to the encryption and decryption 
keys. Finally we have tested our cryptosystem against the 
known plaintext attack. The obtained results prove that our 
cryptosystem could not be broken.  
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